As global powers recalibrate for future conflict, the next battleground won’t be fought solely on land, sea, or cyberspace – it’s already unfolding above us. In orbit, satellites enable everything from navigation and weather forecasting to encrypted military comms and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) gathering or mission support. In this context, counter-space capabilities have become a strategic priority – and cyber operations are quickly emerging as one of the most powerful, least visible tools in this race for dominance.

Having spent years in defence and intelligence environments, I’ve seen first-hand how deeply integrated space assets are in modern operational frameworks. Satellites are no longer passive observers – they are strategic enablers. And when something becomes that central to national security, it inevitably becomes a target.

Cyber as the Weapon of Choice in Counterspace Strategy

While kinetic counter-space capabilities – like direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles – garner headlines and satellite-shattering visuals, they also come with an undeniable risk: attribution is immediate, escalation is likely, and the political fallout is guaranteed. Cyber offers a different equation.

It’s quiet. It’s asymmetric. And in many cases, it’s deniable.

From spoofing GPS signals and hijacking control systems to jamming communication relays and deploying malware into satellite-linked ground stations, cyber-enabled operations give adversaries the ability to disrupt and degrade space assets without ever launching a rocket.

I’ve worked in environments where a small disruption in satellite data flow could impact everything from tactical planning to humanitarian coordination. And I’ve seen how easily false data – or no data – can create a strategic blind spot, if even for just a very short time.

This is the heart of modern cyber warfare: it’s not always about destruction. Sometimes, it’s about delay, doubt, and disarray.

The Hidden Vulnerabilities Orbiting Above Us

Many space assets currently in orbit were designed decades ago, long before cyber hardening was considered a necessity. Their software is outdated, their telemetry links are often unsecured, and physical access for patching or upgrading is nigh on impossible. While we’ve rapidly modernised terrestrial defences, our space-based infrastructure has been slower to catch up – and that lag is not going unnoticed.

What’s more, the increasing privatisation of the space industry means satellite systems are no longer the sole domain of national defence or intelligence agencies. This brings new efficiency, innovation – and risk. Private operators may not be subject to the same security controls, while still managing infrastructure critical to military and national interest.

From Defence Strategy to Cyber Imperative

In my current role at ITSEC, we work with clients who rely heavily on satellite communications from commercial requirements to national interest protection. When we talk about resilience today, we must expand that conversation to include orbital systems. Because in a hyperconnected world, terrestrial security cannot be separated from what’s happening above our heads.

Cyber is now the connective tissue of all domains – land, sea, air and space. And counter-space operations increasingly begin with a keystroke, not a missile.

Building a Resilient Future

The path forward requires a fundamental shift – from passive detection to proactive defence. Governments must work together with private operators to build threat-informed security into satellite systems from design. And where legacy systems remain in play, layered security, segmentation, and constant telemetry monitoring are essential.

But it’s not just about better controls. We need a new diplomatic doctrine – one that recognises cyberattacks on space infrastructure as strategic red lines and establishes norms that treat such interference as violations of international stability.

Because we’re not just talking about losing connectivity. We’re talking about losing visibility, losing trust in our data, and potentially, losing the ability to respond coherently in a crisis or conflict.

And that’s what makes cyber such a dangerous – and attractive – weapon in counter-space strategy. It blurs lines, delays attribution, and manipulates perception. In an age where information is power, that’s often more effective than brute force.